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Giving Codification a Second
Chance- Testimonial Privileges and
the Federal Rules of Evidence
by
KENNETH S. BROUN*
The testimonial privilege rules in the Proposed Rules of
Evidence submitted to Congress by the United States Supreme Court
in 1972 almost doomed the total project. The presence of those rules
became a rallying point for general opposition to the entire proposal
and a symbol for all that was perceived to be wrong with the rules as a
whole Not only was the substance of the proposed privilege rules
vigorously attacked by scholars, practitioners, judges and members of
Congress, the idea that the federal law of privilege should be codified
was rejected by many.2 Many academics and practicing lawyers
preferred an uncodified federal law of privilege, and, in particular,
one that relied upon state privilege law. There was especially
widespread criticism of a federal law of privilege insofar as it would
govern diversity cases.'
In the fallout that followed the submission of the Proposed
Rules, what emerged was a set of evidence rules that included no
codification of rules on testimonial privilege. Indeed, the reaction of
Congress to the attempt to codify those rules led to an enactment of a
* Henry Brandis Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
The author is a former member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence and is presently a consultant to that committee with regard to the possible
adoption of new Federal Rules of Evidence governing privilege. I would like to thank
Louis D. Bilionis, Robert G. Byrd, Daniel J. Capra, John M. Conley, the Honorable J.
Dickson Phillips, Eileen A. Scallen, the Honorable Milton Shadur, and all of the
participants in the faculty workshop at the University of North Carolina School of Law for
their helpful comments on drafts of this article.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 34-60.
3. See infra especially text accompanying notes 48-51.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
[769]
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b), that divested the judiciary of any
authority to make rules on the subject.5
In place of specific rules on privilege, Congress enacted Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, a rule that leaves the recognition of testimonial
privileges in the hands of the courts, to be developed as part of the
federal common law. A federal law of privilege, reflecting this
common-law approach, is to govern federal-question and federal
criminal cases. State rules of privilege are to control all federal cases
governed by state law.6
One could argue that Congress, in adopting Rule 501 and §
2074(b), has settled the matter. Arguably, the idea of codification of
privileges for the federal courts is dead as a result of a failed and
perhaps ill-conceived attempt to treat privilege as simply another
branch of the law of evidence.
Congress opted for case by case development of the law of
privilege largely because of its negative reaction to controversial
proposals] But the solution arrived at is certainly a time-honored
one. Privilege rules are to evolve in traditional common-law
fashion-to be tailored through the judicial process to meet fact
situations as they arise. Such an approach has its benefits, especially
where so many important social policies may conflict. The law can
evolve as needed, without the risk of being frozen at the drafting
stage. Judges are free from the political pressures coming from a
public increasingly fearful of crime as well as interest groups
concerned about the special interests of their professions.
Despite recognizing the strength of such arguments, this article
will take the position that such considerations do not outweigh the
benefits that can be achieved by a codified set of privilege rules. The
demise of the proposed federal privilege rules in 1974 and the
substitution of a common-law approach simply laid the foundation for
a new and better conceived attempt at codification-one that reflects
both better policy and the political reality of what Congress is likely
to do.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.
6. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8-9 (1973). See also infra Part I.
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In order to be successful, a new attempt at codification must
recognize the objections made to the proposed rules as well as credit
crucial decisions made by Congress at the time of the rejection of the
proposed rules. Although Congress decided that it would not enact a
codification of privilege rules, it did make two critical policy decisions
relating to those rules. First, there would be a federal law of
privilege, albeit not one codified in the same manner as the bulk of
the law of evidence, that would govern in federal-question and federal
criminal cases. Second, where state law supplies the rule of decision,
state law of privilege is to govern.
The time has come for a codification of the privilege rules that
builds on these two congressional decisions. This codification, unlike
the first attempt, should be one that recognizes the strong policies
behind the various privileges in all of the states as well as the need for
opportunities for judicial creation of additional privileges. It now
being established that there is a separate federal law of privilege, the
primary justification for codification of those rules is the same as it
was for all of the evidence rules-a desire for clarification, uniformity
and ease of administration. A more generally satisfactory set of rules
could be promulgated governing privilege in cases involving federal
law than that developed by the courts on a circuit-by-circuit, district-
by-district, case-by-case basis. Such rules would not and could not
consider all potential problems. But if drafted with sufficient care
and input from the public, the bar and the judiciary, the codification
can be a significant improvement over the set of rules that have
developed in the federal courts under Rule 501.
Regardless of whether it could have chosen otherwise, Congress
decided that state law is to apply in diversity cases." That
congressional decision clearly satisfies the rule in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins9 and this article does not propose that the decision be
reversed."
8. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 9 (1973); S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6-7 (1974); H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 23-24 (1974).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. At the time of the submission of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and their
ultimate passage by Congress, there was much debate about what law of privilege should
apply in diversity cases. Some authors strongly supported the Advisory Committee and
Supreme Court decision to apply federal privilege rules to all federal litigation, including
diversity actions. See James W. Moore & Helen I. Bendix, Congress, Evidence and
Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 (1974). Others just as passionately urged the application of
state law, at least in diversity cases, whether or not Erie Railroad required such a
dissection. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693
(1974). See generally infra note 48 and accompanying text. This article does not seek to
reopen that debate, but rather assumes that the decision of Congress to apply state law to
cases in which that law supplies the rule of decision is irreversible, for political if not policy
reasons. However, the interests of the federal system "in the just and efficient
Part I of this article traces the legislative history of the privilege
rules promulgated as part of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
Part II discusses the current state of the federal law of privilege. Part
III discusses the pros and cons of codification. Part IV suggests the
general contours of a codified federal law of privilege. Part V
supports the work of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
in seeking to promulgate privilege rules and suggests that the work of
that committee be submitted by the Judicial Conference to the
Supreme Court and ultimately suggested to Congress for enactment
under the provisions of §2074(b).
I. Rejection of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
Governing Privilege
As originally drafted in 1969,11 revised in 197112 and sent to
Congress by the United States Supreme Court in 1972," the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence contained nine rules governing
specific privileges, all of which had existed at common law. Another
rule precluded common-law development of privileges by limiting
privileges to those required by the Constitution, Act of Congress, or
rules of court.'4 Other rules governed questions of voluntary
disclosure,15  protection of privileged matter disclosed under
compulsion or without opportunity to claim privilege' and
prohibition of adverse comment or inference regarding the assertion
of a privilege. 7 The rules were to govern all federal cases, criminal
and civil, including both federal-question and diversity cases."
The specific privileges included in the proposed rules were
privileges for required reports, 9 communications between lawyer and
client, communications between psychotherapist and patient,"
administration of cases brought into the federal courts," as expressed by Professors Moore
and Bendix, supra at 25, are taken into account in some of the discussion, especially in
dealing with the issue of the applicable law in cases containing both federal and state
claims. See infra text accompanying note 279.
11. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District
Courts, 46 F.R.D. 161, Rules 5-01 to 5-13 at 243-84 (1969).
12. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts, 51
F.R.D. 315, Rules 501 to 513 at 356-83 (1971).
13. Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District and Magistrates Courts,
56 F.R.D. 183, Rules 501 to 513 at 230-61 (1972).
14. Proposed Rule of Evidence 501.
15. Proposed Rule of Evidence 511.
16. Proposed Rule of Evidence 512.
17. Proposed Rule of Evidence 513.
18. See Proposed Rule of Evidence 501 Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183,
230 (1972).
19. Proposed Rule of Evidence 502.
20. Proposed Rule of Evidence 503.
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spousal testimony, communications to clergymen,n political vote,
24
trade secrets,25 secrets of state26 and identity of an informer.27
Glaringly absent from the rules was a privilege for marital
communications, a privilege that was well established in federal case
law.' Also noticeably missing was a privilege, existing in many
states29 although not in federal case law,30 generally protecting
communications between physician and patient. Other privileges
found less commonly in state and federal law were excluded from the
submitted rules, including privileges for journalists31  and
accountants.32
Although some scholars not involved in the drafting of the rules
strongly supported the Advisory Committee and ultimately the
Supreme Court draft of the privilege rules,33 most of the academic
21. Proposed Rule of Evidence 504.
22. Proposed Rule of Evidence 505.
23. Proposed Rule of Evidence 506.
24. Proposed Rule of Evidence 507.
25. Proposed Rule of Evidence 508.
26. Proposed Rule of Evidence 509.
27. Proposed Rule of Evidence 510.
28. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291
U.S. 7 (1934). The marital communication privilege, protecting confidential
communications between husband and wife, must be distinguished from the spousal
testimony privilege, which was included in Proposed Rule 505 and gave the accused in a
criminal case a privilege to prevent his or her spouse from testifying. Ironically, the
spousal testimony privilege was severely curtailed by the United States Supreme Court a
few years after the proposed privilege rules were rejected in an opinion that expressly
recognized the continuing validity of the marital communications privilege. Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
29. See I JOHN W. STRONG, ET AL, MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE ch. 11, at 397-421 (5th
ed. 1999); 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 209, at 450 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2000). See also note 238 and accompanying
text, infra.
30. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n. 28 (1977); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d
1032 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. See discussion in CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5426 (1980). See also infra text accompanying
notes 245-49.
32. Id. at § 2427. See also infra text accompanying notes 250-54.
33. In Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
62 GEO. LJ. 125 (1973), the author supported the general concept of federal privileges,
even in diversity cases, although he suggested the addition of a spousal communications
and general physician-patient privilege, as well as other modifications to the privilege rules
as proposed. Moore & Bendix, supra note 10, found the privilege rules a more sensible
approach to privileges than is found in the evidence law of many states; see also Testimony
of Prof. James William Moore, Rules of Evidence, 1974: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, on Fed. Rules of Evidence H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. 29-32
(1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
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comment was adamant in its opposition to the rules as drafted.' So
was the testimony before Congress. Representative William L.
Hungate, chair of the subcommittee that held hearings on the
Supreme Court rules, commented that "50 percent of the complaints
in our committee related to the section on privileges."35 The Senate
Report on the rules called the content of the proposed privilege
provisions "extremely controversial."36  Although some of the
opposition was simply part of a general objection to an evidence
code,37 the arguments against the privilege rules were more frequent
and more vehement.
Current and former members of the judiciary chimed in with
opposition to the rules in general and to the privilege rules in
particular. Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit
harshly condemned of the concept of evidence rules, and expressed
special passion in criticizing the rules on privilege.' Former Supreme
Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg condemned the privilege rules as
rulemaking incursions into substantive matters. Goldberg
commented that even many of those who believed the Court should
approve a code of evidence (and he did not count himself in that
number) "nonetheless doubt that its authority extends to rules of
privilege."39
Groups including the Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
the American College of Trial Lawyers,41 the Washington Council of
Lawyers,42 New York Trial Lawyers Committee,.3 the Project on
34. E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a
Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L. J. 45; Darrell W. Dunham, Testimonial Privileges
in State and Federal Courts: A Suggested Approach, 9 WILLIAMETrE L. J. 26 (1973); Jack
H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. REv. 673 (1975); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L. J. 61 (1973);
Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New
Perspectives, 122 U. PENN. L. REV. 594 (1974).
35. Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 6.
36. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6 (1974).
37. Testimony of George A. Spiegelberg on Behalf of the American College of Trial
Lawyers and the Ad Hoc New York Trial Lawyers Committee, Senate Hearings, supra
note 33, at 96; Testimony of James F. Schaeffer and Joe A. Moore on behalf of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 82; Testimony
of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Proposed Rules of Evidence, 1973: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. On Reform of
Fed. Criminal Laws, 93d Cong. 261-65 (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings].
38. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 263-64.
39. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 156.
40. Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 82.
41. Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 96.
42. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 158-91.
43. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 203-05.
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Corporate Responsibility,M and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, Inc. 
41
opposed the privilege rules.
These groups and others had made similar protests before the
Advisory Committee, both with regard to the rules as originally
promulgated in 1969 and prior to the 1971 revision. 6 In its 1971
revision, the Committee took steps to better articulate the rationale
for codifying a federal law of privilege governing both federal-
question and diversity cases, but left the content of the privilege rules
substantially intact.
47
There were several prongs to the arguments made in opposition
to the privilege rules. First, there was strong displeasure expressed at
an attempt to codify federal privilege rules in a way that ignored state
privileges, especially in diversity cases.4M Even assuming that the rules
were arguably procedural, so as to satisfy Hanna v. Plumer,49 scholars,
practitioners and judges argued that the strong policies behind the
law of a state giving rise to a privileged relationship should be
considered, especially in dealing with marital privileges.0 Many
opined that such policies were strong enough to call for adherence to
a state privilege not only in diversity cases, but also in federal-
44. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 392.
45. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 420.
46. See Statement of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter to the Advisory Committee, House
Hearings, supra note 37, at 554.
47. Compare the Rule 5-01 Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 243-48 (1969),
with the Rule 501 Advisory Committee's Note, 51 F.R.D. 315,356-60 (1971).
48. See David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956) (there is a constitutional duty in
diversity cases to follow the state law of privilege); Ronan E. Degnan, The Law of Federal
Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 300 (1962) (where the author, although no
advocate of privilege and a strong proponent of federal rules of evidence applicable in all
cases, states that state law should govern privilege-even those like physician-patient-
that were an "instrument of fraud" adding that "it is a substantial affront to strive for a
juster justice than the state wishes to provide."); Ely, supra note 10, at 740 (even if there is
no compulsion under Hanna to follow state privilege law or even if adopted by Congress
there is Congressional power to adopt privilege rules, "it will ignore a view of federalism
that admittedly is not the Constitution's, but has nonetheless throughout our history been
imposed on the allocation of lawmaking authority in connection with the diversity
jurisdiction").
49. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
50. E.g., Testimony of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 263; Testimony of Charles R.
Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr. on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers,
House Hearings, supra note 37, at 160; Testimony of George S. Leisure on behalf of the
New York Trial Lawyers Committee, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 203-04; Letter
from Alvin K. Hellerstein on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Proposed Rules of Evidence (Supplement, 1973): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93d Cong. 307
[hereinafter House Hearings Supp.].
question cases where a failure to recognize the existence of a privilege
could have an adverse impact on a relationship privileged under state
policy and law. 1
Second, objections were raised in the academic community' and
by others in testimony before Congress53 to the elimination of the
ability of courts to formulate new privileges if the circumstances
warranted. Judge Friendly expressed concern that the proposed rules
would "freeze the law of evidence."'
Finally, the specific decisions made by the drafters with regard to
individual privileges were questioned in the strongest terms. The
exclusion of spousal communications from the marital privileges"5 and
the narrowing of the physician-patient privilege to one involving
psychotherapists only were the most frequent targets of attack.5 6 The
absence of a journalist's privilege was also an object of concern for
many. 7 On the other side of the coin, the juxtaposition of the
51. See Louisell, supra note 48. See also Dunham, supra note 34 (urging recognition of
State interests in choosing what privilege law to apply); Weinberg, supra note 34 (arguing
against the rules of evidence in their entirety, preferring reference to forum state
evidentiary law); Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEx. L. REV. 371 (1977) (noting that
even determination of relevancy may involve determination of state substantive law);
Letter from Mark Reutlinger, House Hearings Supp., supra note 50, at 242-44 (arguing
that, as a matter of policy, federal courts should defer to state law). But see Proposed Rule
501 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1972); Testimony of Edward W.
Cleary, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 94.
52. Krattenmaker, supra note 34.
53. See Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr. on behalf of the Washington
Council of Lawyers, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 158, 160; Testimony of Jack C.
Landau on behalf of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, House Hearings,
supra note 37, at 372.
54. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 248.
55. Letter from Neil E. Falconer, House Hearings Supp., supra note 50, at 333
(elimination of the marital communications privilege "immoral and unworkable);
Testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 143, 146-47.
56. See the criticism of the elimination of marital and physician privileges in Black,
supra note 34; Ely, supra note 10 (expressing concern for the elimination of both the
marital communications and general physician-patient privilege in light of the strong
policy reflected in the existence of such privileges in most states); Friedenthal, supra note
34 (criticizing not only the elimination of marital communications privilege and the
drafting of the state secrets privilege, but also the Advisory Committee work generally);
Krattenmaker, supra note 34, at 69-70; Testimony of Charles R. Halpern and George T.
Frampton, Jr. on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers, House Hearings, supra
note 37, at 158, 160; Testimony of George S. Leisure on behalf of the New York Trial
Lawyers Committee, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 203-04.
57. Testimony of Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr. on behalf of the
Washington Council of lawyers, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 160, 164; Letter from
Corydon B. Dunham on behalf of the National Broadcasting Co., House Hearings, supra
note 37, at 544; Testimony of Hon. Bertram L. Podell, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 7;
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consideration of the rules with the events surrounding Watergate
focused a storm of protest against the broad scope of the proposed
privileges for secrets of state and official information. s
Rather than dealing with the specific and substantive criticisms of
the proposed privilege rules head-on, Congress sidestepped the issue.
There would be a substantial codification of much of the law of
evidence including topics such as presumptions, relevancy and
hearsay, but there would be no codification of the law of privilege.
There was to be a federal law of privilege, but it would be governed
by the "principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience."59
The controversy over the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
was not only a controversy over the merits of the proposals, but also
about process. Many of the opponents of the privilege rules
expressed concern that the policy issues inherent in the recognition or
nonrecognition of Erivileges were ill-suited to the Court initiated
rulemaking process. Ultimately, the Federal Rules of Evidence were
enacted by Congress, rather than approved under the process
provided by the Rules Enabling Act. 1 Congress then returned the
Testimony of Jack C. Landau on behalf of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 372.
58. Testimony of Hon. Bertram L. Podell, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 6;
Testimony of Jack C. Landau on behalf of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 369; Testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg, House
Hearings, supra note 37, at 157; Letter from Hon. James Abourezk, House Hearings, supra
note 37, at 388; Testimony of Terry F. Lenzner and Joseph D. Gebhardt on behalf of the
Project on Corporate Responsibility, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 393; Testimony of
Alan B. Morrison on behalf of Public Citizen, Inc., House Hearings, supra note 37, at 424;
Testimony of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, House Hearings, supra note 37, at 264. But see the testimony in favor of
the state secrets provisions of the proposed rule from Robert Warren, Attorney General
of Wisconsin on behalf of the National Association of Attorneys General, House
Hearings, supra note 37, at 338-42.
59. FED. R. EvID. 501.
60. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe
general rules of practice, procedure and evidence for the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
With regard to rules others than those involving evidentiary privilege, the Supreme Court
transmits a proposed rule to the Congress not later than May 1. If there is no
congressional action, the rule takes effect on December 1 of the year submitted to
Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a). For criticism of the concept of an evidence code adopted
under the Rules Enabling Act, see, e.g., Testimony of Henry J. Friendly, House Hearings,
supra note 37, at 246-65; Testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg, House Hearings, supra note 37,
at 142-58. Congress adopted most of the rules as submitted by the Supreme Court.
However, it did significantly amend several rules and, as noted, totally abolished the
Proposed Rules' attempt to codify privileges. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8-9 (1973); S.
REP. No. 93-1277, at 6-7 (1974); H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 23-24 (1974).
61. Public Law 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Congressional enactment of the rules,
rather than adherence to the procedure set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, see supra note
60, was not without controversy. See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 34.
rulemaking function to the judiciary with regard to future additions,
deletions and amendments-except with regard to rules governing
privilege. Congress kept the prerogative for creation of privilege
rules for itself. The judiciary, including the United States Supreme
Court, may suggest new privilege rules, but any such rule would have
to be adopted by Congress rather than simply allowed to come into
existence as is the case with other rules of evidence.62 Otherwise, the
law of privilege was to develop in the federal courts in common-law
fashion-case-by-case and fact situation by fact situation.
There are several significant lessons to be learned from this
legislative history regarding a possible future codification of the
privilege rules. First, Congress likes privileges, better than do the
courts. Courts, recognizing that privileges may well deprive them of
relevant, indeed crucial evidence, often reject new privileges and even
more often narrowly construe existing ones.6' Congress, fulfilling its
political function, listens to public comment supporting specific
privileges, especially those protecting valued relationships, even when
such comment emanates from interest groups which see a particular
privilege as protecting their self-interests.6' Congress also respects the
decisions of its state counterparts in this area, where state-created
relationships are often the focus of the law. As expressed in Rule 501,
our national legislature has protected those state expressed policies,
at least to the extent of requiring their recognition in cases where
state law provides the rule of decision. By rejecting a set of rules that
would have eliminated the marital communications and general
physician-patient privilege, Congress left the door open for judicial
recognition of such privileges in federal-question and criminal cases.65
Despite its concern for the interests of the states in protecting
relationships created or fostered by them, Congress is willing to see
and has called upon the courts to create a federal law of privilege
applicable where state substantive law is not controlling. In light of
the legislative history, the direction of Rule 501 for the courts to be
guided by the principles of the common law should be read as a
62. Any "rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege" must be
approved by an Act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. 2074(b).
63. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 708-710 (1974). But the judicial reaction to the law of privilege is not always
so adverse. With these cases, compare Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) and Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
64. For a discussion of the susceptibility of the legislative branch to such lobbying, see
Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the
Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771 (1999). See also the discussion of the policy of
the physician-patient privilege in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5522 (1989).
65. Federal courts continued their recognition of the marital communication privilege
(see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text) and their rejection of a general physician-
patient privilege (see infra note 93 and accompanying text).
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dictate not to stray too far from the established privilege norms
existing in most states.' Nevertheless, there is a clear opportunity for
development of a federal law of privilege within those broad
parameters. Such a federal law of privilege is now maturing in our
courts. The question is whether now is the time for its codification.
H. The Development of a Federal Law of Privilege Under
Rule 501
A. The Current State of the Federal Law of Privilege
There is a federal law of privilege that is as alive and vibrant as in
any of the other court systems in the nation. Except in diversity cases,
the federal courts have not hesitated to adopt and give shape to most
of the privileges that existed at common law, without deferring to the
law of any state.67 Although a number of privileges proposed by
litigants have been rejected in the federal courts,"" the courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, have recognized
new privileges.69
Despite the seemingly monumental task of deciding what
Congress meant by the "principles of the common law" interpreted
"in light of reason and experience,"70  the courts have developed
66. The United States Supreme Court paid significant heed to the existence of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege in all states in recognizing such a privilege in the federal
system. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). See discussion infra in text accompanying
notes 102-03.
67. Instances of the development of the federal law of privilege are referred to
throughout this article. See infra particularly cases involving the attorney-client privilege
cited in notes 73-77. However, there have been occasions in which lower federal courts
have deferred to the privilege law of the state in nondiversity cases. E.g., In re Hampers,
651 F.2d 19,23 (1st Cir. 1981) (state privilege against disclosure of tax return information);
Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422,424-
25 (D. Mass. 1989) (state psychotherapist-patient privilege).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
69. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), and cases recognizing a journalist's
privileges, infra note 82.
70. The model for Rule 501, was Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, which in turn
was based on Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) and Wolfle v. United States, 291
U.S. 7 (1934) where the Court relied upon common-law principles to guide it in the
formulation of the law of privilege. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule
of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO.L.J.1781, 1788-94 (1994).
Congressman William L. Hungate, chair of the House committee that had dealt with the
Rules, commented in his testimony before the Senate Committee: "It has been the effort
of the committee to draw this bill so that the law of privileges is left where we found it."
Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 6. The Senate report on the rules noted: "[O]ur action
should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case
basis." S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).
models for the creation and treatment of privilege that are at least
workable. As a leading text notes, "Congress intended to leave
privilege law where it had found it, but not to freeze the evolution of
the federal common law with respect to the creation, modification, or
repeal of specific privileges." '  And the courts have, with
characteristic caution, moved the law forward-slowly. However,
given the reality of acting only on a case-by-case basis, whether they
have moved the law with sufficient completeness, alacrity or certainty
is another question.
Questions involving evidentiary privileges have been frequently
litigated since the enactment of Rule 501.' The federal law of
attorney-client privilege has evolved in hundreds of cases at all
federal court levels, led by the Supreme Court of the United States in
four cases since 1976."3 In those cases, the Court has made significant
pronouncements with regard to procedural aspects of the privilege,74
its relationship to the Fifth Amendment,75 its application in the
corporate setting,7 6 and its survival beyond the death of the client.' A
spousal testimony privilege has been recognized, although limited to
invocation by the testifying spouse.' The Supreme Court has, by
dictum, recognized the existence of a marital communications
privilege,79 and lower court cases have frequently applied the
privilege.'0 Although the Supreme Court did not find that the United
States Constitution compels recognition of a journalist's privilege,"' a
limited form of that privilege exists under the case law of most
71. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29, § 169 at 215; see, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v.
EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980).
72. See generally Miller, supra note 64, where the authors note that federal courts
have now confirmed all nine privileges contained in the Proposed Rules. See also 2
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL §§ 501.01-03 (8th ed. 2002).
73. E.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554 (1989); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. 343 (1986) (trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the
corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications).
74. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
75. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
76. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
77. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
78. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
79. Id. at 51.
80. E.g., United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398,404 (8th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1240-43 (6th Cir. 1985).
81. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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circuits.' The federal courts have also confirmed other privileges
proposed in the Supreme Court draft, including the clergy-
communicant privilege,8 3 a qualified trade secrets privilege,' and a
state secrets privilege.6
Other privileges have been rejected by the federal courts. The
Supreme Court has rejected a privilege for academic peer review
and one for state legislators.'6 Lower courts have consistently rejected
accountants' privileges,6 parent-child privileges, 9 a general physician-
patient privilege,' and others. 91
Jaffee v. Redmond' is in many ways the most significant case
dealing with the federal law of privilege. The United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Jaffee provides a foundation for analysis of the
usefulness of any codification of federal rules governing privilege as
well as some guidance as to what those rules ought to look like.
Like the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the federal courts have
consistently refused to recognize a general physician-patient
privilege.93 However, as did the proposed Rules of Evidence, the
82. E.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705,712-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d
1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir.
1981); Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc. 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000).
83. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,384 (3d Cir. 1990); United States
v. Mohanlal, 867 F. Supp. 199,200 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
84. E.g., Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. Armco, Inc. 132 F.R.D. 24 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
85. E.g. In re under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1991). In addition to these judicially
recognized privileges, as provided by the language of Rule 501, there are many federal
statutes that recognize a right to withhold information - privileges of a sort. See the
examples given by 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29 at § 220, including Cotton
Statistics and Estimates Act, 7 U.S.C. § 472; Census Act, 13 U.S.C § 9; Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. 930(c); Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. 41; Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1504.
See also Daniel J. Capra, The Federal Law of Privileges, 16 LrrIG. 32 (1989).
86. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
87. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
88. E.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Int'l
Horizons, Inc. 689 F.2d 996, 1004 (11th Cir. 1982). Those cases after the adoption of the
Federal Rules are consistent with federal law prior to 1975, see Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973). See also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984)
(no privilege for tax accrual workpapers prepared by corporation's independent public
accountant). Congress has now provided for a privilege of the same dimensions as the
attorney-client privilege with regard to communications between a taxpayer and "any
federally authorized tax practitioner." 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
89. E.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997).
90. E.g., Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moore,
970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1988).
91. E.g., In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (protective function
privilege for secret service).
92. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
93. See cases cited supra note 90. Although there is no federal general physician-
patient privilege, Congress has enacted statutes protecting certain kinds of medical
Court in Jaffee recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege. In so
ruling, the Court looked first to the language of Rule 501, finding
itself authorized to define new privileges.' The Court recognized,
citing both legislative history and prior Supreme Court cases' that
the rule directed federal courts to continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges.96 In deciding whether to
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court applied a
utilitarian test:97 whether a privilege protecting confidential
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient
"'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence."' The Court stated "that reason and
experience" persuade it that it does.
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence
and trust." Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can
often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination,
objective information supplied by the patient and the results of
diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is
willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the
problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure
of confidential communications made during counseling sessions
may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere
possibility of disclosure may impede development of the
confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.Y
The court found that a psychotherapist privilege would serve the
public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment
for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional
problem." The Court found the likely evidentiary benefit that would
result from the denial of the privilege to be modest. Without a
privilege, much of the desirable evidence would be unlikely to come
into being-there would be no confidential conversationsY"
Of particular interest in considering the relationship between
federal and state law was the Court's consideration of state
information. E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a) (protection for confidential information obtained
in drug abuse prevention program).
94. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) citing FED. R. EVID. 501.
95. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980).
96. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9.
97. The utilitarian justification for testimonial privileges is discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 161-72.
98. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
99. IM. at 10 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 11-12.
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psychotherapist privileges. The court noted that all fifty states and
the District of Columbia have some form of psychotherapist privilege,
either by statute or judicial decision."°  "Denial of the federal
privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state
legislation that was enacted to foster these confidential
communications.""0 3  The Court also looked to the inclusion of a
psychotherapist privilege in the Proposed Rules of Evidence and to
the statement of the Senate Judiciary committee that its action in
rejecting the proposed rules "should not be understood as
disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient... privilege
contained in the [proposed] rules."' '
In defining the privilege, the Supreme Court parted ways with
the Court of Appeals, which had recognized only a qualified
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial
judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's
interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would
eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. As we explained in
Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the
participants in the confidential conversation "must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which
purposes to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."'
Jaffee confirmed some things we thought we already knew. First,
there is a federal law of privilege. Second, that law was not frozen at
any particular time-either at some imaginary point in the evolution
of the common law or at the time of the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence-but could develop in a way that recognized new
privileges. Despite the protestations of the dissenters in Jaffee,1°6 that
102. lId at 12-13.
103. Id. at 13.
104. Id. at 14-15 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1277 at 13). The fact that the Court attached
some significance to the existence of a proposed federal rule establishing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege (Proposed Rule 504) is consistent with language in some
lower court cases, but inconsistent with that in other cases. See Capra, supra note 85. The
conclusion one might reasonably draw is that the presence of a proposed rule was helpful
to the court, although the absence of such a rule is not fatal. See, e.g., Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) and other cases recognizing a marital communications privilege
cited supra note 80. Moreover, the Court, by applying the privilege to social workers in
Jaffee, created a privilege significantly broader than that contained in Proposed Rule 504.
105. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393
(1981)).
106. Justice Scalia dissented in Jaffee, castigating the majority for its creation of a "new,
vast, and ill defined" privilege. Id. at 20. He expressed particular opposition to the
extension of such a privilege to social workers. Id. at 27-36. He was joined in this latter
aspect of the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
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recognition could occur judicially rather than through act of
Congress.
In addition, the Court's reasoning in Jaffee also provides the
basis for predicting the approach the Court would take to the entire
question of privilege. First, the Court used a utilitarian or
instrumental analysis-the privilege serves a function in society by
promoting the free flow of information between psychotherapist and
patient. Although not precluding other considerations, such as the
role that considerations of privacy may play in the recognition of
privileges, it is clear that a strong utilitarian argument may be
persuasive." Second, the Court is greatly influenced by the
prevailing view in the states-the denial of the federal privilege would
frustrate the purposes of state legislation. Lastly, whether or not it
would require all recognized privileges to be absolute, the Court
strongly and persuasively argues for certainty and clarity.
Jaffee demonstrates that the law of federal privileges may
develop within a common-law framework. New privileges are not
precluded, although an analysis of other cases would support a view
that their recognition will not be a common occurrence.08 But the
Court's decision and its struggle with both the existence and scope of
the privilege also may illustrate the value of a carefully drafted set of
privilege rules that bring certainty to the area and take into account
both existing federal policy and prevailing state interests.
B. Federal Leadership in the Law of Privilege
Federal privilege law is not radical either in its recognition of
privileges or in its definition of them. Certainly, the law of privilege,
as is true of virtually all areas of law, differs from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and the federal law is every bit as unique as that of each
individual state. An examination of the general statements of the
law' °. will, however, reveal differences at the edges but a common
core of agreed upon principles. Furthermore, as might be expected,
federal cases defining privileges have become important benchmarks
for state courts in defining their own law of privilege-particularly
with regard to the attorney-client privilege. Landmark Supreme
Court decisions with regard to the lawyer-client privilege and the
107. The Court's distinction between the psychotherapist-patient and a general
physician-patient privilege on utilitarian grounds is discussed infra in the text
accompanying note 244.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493
U.S. 182 (1990).
109. A comparison of the law as expressed in texts dealing with federal evidence, e.g., 2
SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 72, with statements of the general law of
privilege, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, chs. 8-11, will reveal few remarkable or basic
differences.
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reaction of the state courts to those decisions serve as an example of
the leadership role of the federal courts. The state courts are not
bound to accept the Supreme Court's guidance in the area of privilege
except to the extent that the Court bases its decision on the United
States Constitution. Yet, decisions of the Court in cases such as
Swidler & Berlin v. United States,"° United States v. Zolin,"' Upjohn
Co v. United States,"2 and Fisher v. United States". have become a
point of departure for the state courts in dealing with the attorney-
client privilege. The Upjohn case has been particularly significant in
the state court system. In that case, the Court, while declining to
formulate a definitive rule, rejected the control group test with regard
to communications in the corporate context. 4  Not all state courts
have accepted the Upjohn approach"5 but many have."6  What is
perhaps more significant is that the state courts have often looked to
federal cases such as Upjohn as a point of departure in considering
the issues."' Upjohn has been cited in 43 states since the date of the
opinion in 1981."' Whether or not states have adopted its rationale,
the fact that the case has been so carefully considered by the state
courts is an indication of the force of federal precedent in the state
courts." 9
C. Uncertainty in the Federal Law of Privilege
The development of the law of privilege since the enactment of
Rule 501 has resolved many significant issues regarding recognized
privileges. There is little disagreement among the circuits on a
number of important questions. Such resolution has been achieved
110. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
111. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
112. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
113. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
114. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97 (1981).
115. E.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982); Nat'l
Tank Co., v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993). The Texas legislature overturned
the result in the Brotherton case and enacted a rule consistent with Upjohn. See In re
Monsanto Co., 998 S.W. 2d 917, 922 (Tex. App. 1999) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)).
116. E.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Dist. Court, 718 P.2d 1044, 1048-49
(Colo. 1986); Shew v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 714 A.2d 664, 670 (Conn. 1998); S. Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1994).
117. See, e.g., Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993) where the court
carefully considered the Upjohn analysis, compared it to the control group test, and
developed a test of its own. The Arizona legislature later overturned the Goodfarb test
and went to a test based more closely on Upjohn. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2234 (West 2001).
118. This number was obtained in September, 2001, through Westlaw's Keycite service.
119. Similarly, by September 2001, the Fisher case has been cited by the courts of 42
states; Zolin by the courts of 24 states and, since its promulgation in 1998, Swidler & Berlin
has been cited by the courts of 11 states according to Westlaw's Keycite service.
either through relatively consistent application of agreed upon
principles 2 or by a Supreme Court decision, as in Upjohn.
21
But, not surprisingly, there are other questions and discrepancies
that remain unresolved. No codification will resolve all problems
existing in the common law. Yet, good, thoughtful drafting can
eliminate many of the most troublesome areas and at least suggest a
generalized approach for dealing with others. In the case of the law
of testimonial privilege, such problems are significant enough that
remedying them through codification should be seriously considered.
Although it would not be useful to attempt to catalog all
uncertainties, a few examples illustrate the kinds of questions that
might be resolved through a new set of carefully drafted rules
governing privilege.
Because it is the privilege most commonly invoked in the federal
courts, most of the unresolved issues involve the attorney-client
privilege. For example, questions arise concerning the ability of a
corporation or its officers to assert the attorney-client privilege with
regard to communications between corporate officers and corporate
counsel in an action brought against it or on its behalf by its
shareholders. The leading case is from the Fifth Circuit, Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, where the court set out criteria for the abrogation of
the privilege in such a situation. Although no court of appeals has
completely rejected Garner, a few district courts have done so. "
Some federal courts, in addition to recognizing the existence of
limitations in a derivative action, have applied the Garner criteria to
actions brought by shareholders in their own right. 4 Others have
held that the privilege must apply and that the Garner criteria are
inapplicable where the action is not derivative.'3 Commentators have
seriously questioned the wisdom of the Garner test, 26 particularly
120. See 2 SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 72; 2 MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29, §§ 169-231.
121. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See also discussion of Upjohn,
supra in text accompanying note 114.
122. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
123. See, e.g., Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 389, 390-91 (D. Conn.
1986); Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (D. Neb. 1995). Other, more recent,
district court cases have embraced the Garner doctrine, even without approval from the
Court of Appeals in the Circuit, see, e.g, In re Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., 190
F.R.D. 527 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
124. Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1992); Ward v. Succession of
Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., 217 F.3d
293,298 (5th Cir. 2000).
125. Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18,23 (9th Cir. 1981).
126. Stephen A. Saltzberg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder
Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1984).
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outside the context of a derivative action.' Questions also arise
concerning the application of the Garner principles outside the
context of shareholder suits-for example, in other cases in which the
party had a fiduciary obligation to the opposing party."
There is a virtually universally accepted exception to the
attorney-client privilege that abrogates the privilege if the services of
the lawyer were used to enable the client to commit a crime or
fraud.12 ' Does the crime-fraud exception apply to statements made in
furtherance of intentional torts other than fraud? Several federal
cases that have looked at the issue have expanded the exception to
include intentional torts. However, virtually all are district court
opinions.3 ' The District of Columbia Circuit uses language that
includes other types "of misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with
the basic premises of the adversary system." However, the District of
Columbia Circuit decisions using this language have always involved
criminal or fraudulent activities.131  The Tenth Circuit has expressly
rejected an expansion of the exception beyond crime or fraud.'32
Another area of significant federal court uncertainty concerns
the effect of an inadvertent disclosure of matter covered by the
attorney-client or another privilege. Some federal courts have held
that there is a waiver regardless of the circumstances of the
disclosure, including situations in which no blame can be attached to
either the attorney or her client.' Other courts have looked to the
circumstances and have held that an inadvertent disclosure does not
necessarily result in waiver."M There are a significant number of cases
dealing with the issue35 as well on the distinct but related issue of
127. Jack B. Friedman, Is the Garner Qualification of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege Viable after Jaffee v. Redmond?, 55 Bus. LAW. 243 (1999).
128. See I PAUL R. RICE, AaITORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §
8:23 (West 1999).
129. See UNIF. R. EvID. 502; 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 95, at 380-83.
130. E.g., Recycling Solutions, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 175 F.R.D. 407 (D.D.C. 1997);
Horizon of Hope Ministry v. Clark County, Ohio, 115 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Ohio 1986); cases
collected in J. F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications with Respect to Contemplated Tortious Acts, 2 A.L.R.3d 861 (1965).
131. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d
793,812 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
132. Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995).
133. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (attorney-client) (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (attorney-client);
Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867 (1st Cir. 1995) (attorney-
client).
134. E.g., Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993); Redland Soccer
Club v. Dept. of the Army, 55 F. 3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995).
135. See cases collected in 2 RICE, supra note 128, §§ 9:70-9:77; John T. Hundley,
Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-Federal Law, 159
A.L.R. Fed. 153 (2000).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
whether, under some circumstances, there can be a selective waiver of
a privilege.136
There is even a split of authority in the federal courts as to the
extent that communications from an attorney to her client are
privileged. Under the broader view, such communications are
privileged regardless of whether the lawyer's communications reveal
confidences from the client.137 Under the narrower view, the attorney-
client privilege is held not to protect a communication by an attorney
to her client where the communication does not reveal a client
confidence."
Similar problems exist with regard to other privileges recognized
under the federal common law. For example, the federal circuits take
different approaches in looking at the question of whether the marital
communications privilege applies where the parties have acted jointly
in the commission of a crime. Some cases articulate a pure joint
participant privilege: the communication is not privileged if it had to
do with the commission of a crime in which both spouses were
participants.'39 Another case describes the exception as applying
where statements are made in furtherance of criminal activity.
Others require that the communications involved "patently illegal
activity."'' In addition, the various federal circuits take different
approaches to how the viability of an existing marriage affects the
application of the marital communication privilege. Some apply a test
that says that the privilege does not exist where the couple has
separated and the marriage is irreconcilable.142 Others look simply to
the question of whether the couple has permanently separated. 4
Like all other common-law rules, the courts will no doubt
eventually work through all of these questions and the countless
others that still exist in the federal law. The common-law tradition
would leave the development of the law to such a case-by-case
determination. However, even recognizing that not all potential
problems can or should be resolved in any codification of any rule of
law, it would be much simpler and much more certain for all
concerned if there were a federal rule guiding the courts through the
136. Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) with
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phillippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). See
also 2 SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 72, §501.02[5][k][iii] at 501-48 to 501-
50.
137. E.g., Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355,1370-71 (10th Cir. 1997).
138. E.g., Potts v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 118 F.R.D. 597,603 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
139. E.g, United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1992).
140. United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724,730-31 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398, 401 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sims,
755 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1985).
142. United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758,761 (9th Cir. 1995).
143. United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 (6th Cir. 1993).
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more predictable and important issues. The question remains
whether there are such adverse consequences from codification in this
area of the law as to militate against such a fix.
111. The Value of Codification
A. Codification in General
Codification lends itself to uniform, consistent application in
ways that common-law development cannot do. In its Preliminary
Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States noted: "Rules of court used to
regulate the admissibility of evidence and the competency of
witnesses have many of the advantages displayed by other rules of
court governing procedure. The principles, precedents, and
procedures can be organized, clarified, simplified, and abbreviated."''M
Although the privilege rules he proposed were rejected and
many of the other evidence rules he drafted changed significantly,
the genius of the Advisory Committee's reporter, Edward Cleary has
never been doubted. Cleary expressed the justification for the
codification of the law of evidence generally as based on five
principles:
(1) Evidence, more than any other field of law, calls for making
decisions on the run. An effective law of evidence thus must be an
accessible law of evidence.
(2) Literature on evidence is complex and of tremendous volume.
(3) Uncertainties inevitably plague the trial lawyer and judge.
(4) Making law by decision is an accidental and fragmentary
process.
(5) Precedent may be misleading as a reflection of investigation and
experience.'45
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress
are often criticized on their individual merit,'46 the rules have clearly
served to provide a uniform, relatively easy to understand set of
guidelines for federal judges. The value of the codified federal rules
144. 30 F.R.D. 73, 116 (1962) (citing Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal
Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429,530-33 (1957)).
145. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 547-48.
146. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence with Supporting Commentary, 171 F.R.D. 330 (1997).
has been recognized by the thirty-nine states which have adopted
rules based upon them."
B. Why Codify the Law of Privilege?
The principal distinction between privilege and other
admissibility rules, i.e., that privileges are based on policy
considerations external to the litigation at hand rather than
facilitating rational determination of that litigation, does not diminish
the need for organized, clarified, and simplified rules. Moreover, if,
as will be discussed, the rationale of privilege is to protect the privacy
of individuals, there is a strong reason to provide a set of consistent,
easily understood principles so as to readily determine the limits of
that privacy.
In 1962, Professor Ronan Degnan foresaw the eventual
development of a fairly sophisticated federal law of evidence through
the case law. However he opined that that law would not be created
without the constant intervention of the courts of appeals and
Supreme Court of the United States-and that it would still not be
uniform."4 Most of the federal law of evidence has not been left to
this case-by-case development. The law of privilege has been, and it
has developed in exactly the way that Professor Degnan predicted-
there is a reasonably sophisticated federal law of privilege, but it has
been created and continues to be redefined through intervention by
the higher courts. And it is still not uniform.
Professor James William Moore, in his testimony before the
Senate committee considering the house amendment that eventually
became Federal Rule 501, believed that such a rule-providing
essentially for common-law development of the law of privilege-was
necessarily "provisional in nature. He found that the proposed
Rule 501 had merit, but only as an interim statement. He was
concerned about cases in which federal and nonfederal issues were
intertwined50 and, more importantly for the question of future
codification, he was convinced that "structured and adequate rules on
privilege will be slow in emerging."'' Professor Moore was right to
be concerned on his second ground. In the more than twenty-five
years since the promulgation of Rule 501, federal privilege rules have
147. UNIF. R. EVID., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Rules Have Been Adopted (West
2001). Thirty-nine states and Puerto Rico are listed as having adopted the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, which, at the time of their adoption by these jurisdictions, were very closely
based on the Federal Rules.
148. Degnan, supra note 48.
149. Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 32.
150. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 263-80.
151. Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 33.
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emerged, but, as previously discussed, 52 they have been slow in
coming and the court decisions with regard to them are filled with
inconsistencies and inadequate guidance for the judicial system,
counsel, and ordinary citizens.
But are codified rules the answer? In order to decide whether to
codify, it is useful to look to see what exactly might be codified.
(1) What Do We Mean by Privileges?
There are rules that are based at least in part on policy
considerations external to the litigation, such as rules governing the
admission of evidence of subsequent repairs" or of settlement
negotiations,'m that some would classify as privileges.55 Such rules
are already part of the Federal Rules of Evidence."6 However, such
rules are also based in part on considerations of relevancy and are
directed only to the question of admissibility of evidence in the
proceedings between the parties to the litigation' 7 not to the
question of whether someone, a party or a nonparty to the litigation,
can be compelled in discovery, before a grand jury or in another
setting to disclose information. A better analysis separates such rules
from true privileges. Rules of privilege exempt someone from the
general duty to provide information to a tribunal59 and are enforced
to prevent the introduction of evidence even though the witness
invoking the rule has no connection to the litigation at hand.'6
The rules we ought to talk about codifying are the kinds of rules
that were contained in the rejected Article V of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence-privileges such as those governing
152. See supra Part IL
153. FED. R. EVID. 407.
154. FED. R. EVID. 408.
155. See Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (II)logic of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339 (1992).
156. In addition to Rules 407 and 408, see also FED. R. EVID. 409, Payment of Medical
and Similar Expenses; FED. R. EVID. 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and
Related Statements.
157. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, §§ 266, 267; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31,
§5422 at 668.
158. FED. R. EVID. 606(b), which prohibits a juror from testifying as to matters
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations, is another example of an evidence
rule that is not based even in part on considerations of relevancy. The rule is based on
considerations unique to the jury system. It is intended to encourage freedom of
deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance
and embarrassment. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b), Advisory Committee's Note. Testimonial
privileges of the kind contained in rejected Article V of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence are based on considerations that are so different that it is not useful to consider
Rule 606(b) in connection with them.
159. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5422, at 668 (1980).
160. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 72.1.
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communications between attorney and client, psychotherapist and
patient, penitent and clergy member, and husband and wife.
(2) Why Should We Protect Privileged Communications from Disclosure?
In separating true privilege rules from hybrids such as the rule
limiting evidence of subsequent repairs, the vulnerability of privilege
rules in general is exposed. True privilege rules do nothing to assist
the truth-finding function in the case being adjudicated. Rather, they
detract from it.
The traditional justification for this departure from the usual and
ideal quest for a rational determination in a litigated matter was
utilitarian or instrumental. 16' Although privileges may hinder the
truth-seeking process by withholding information from the parties
and, most significantly, the trier of fact, proponents have sought to
justify the rules on the ground that they serve to protect some
relationship or other societal goal. 62
Dean Wigmore provided the most frequently quoted statement
of the conditions necessary to the establishment of a privilege under
the utilitarian analysis:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation. 63
Whether Wigmore's final criterion is satisfied with regard to
existing privileges has not been without debate even when applied to
the most enduring of all evidentiary privileges-that protecting
communications between attorney and client. More than a century
161. I use the terms "utilitarian" and "instrumental" interchangeably to refer to the
theory that the privilege rules are justified as useful in protecting a relationship or other
societal goal. Some authors use the term "utilitarian" in reference to such a rationale, see
1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 72; others use the term "instrumental" to refer to the
same policy, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5422.
162. See Louisell, supra note 48, at 102. Professor Louisell noted:
I believe that the historic privileges of confidential communications protect
significant human values in the interest of the holders of the privileges, and that
the fact that the existence of these guarantees sometimes result in the exclusion
from a trial of probative evidence is merely a secondary and incidental feature of
the privileges' vitality.
Professor Louisell also cites the wide acceptance of privilege in other legal systems based
upon a similar rationale. Id.
163. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 531 (1940).
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ago, Jeremy Bentham argued that the attorney-client privilege
protected only the guilty; the innocent did not need it.' Wigmore
responded by agreeing that Bentham was right in some cases, but that
the lines between right and wrong were not as clearly defined as
Bentham would have us believe.' The privilege at least gives more
freedom to the client to consult with a lawyer, and to the lawer to
determine the legal implications of information received.1  In
essence, the existence of the privilege lets the client feel free to pass
on information so that the lawyer can judge for herself whether or not
it is of significance in the matter about which the client has consulted.
Yet, despite his defense of the privilege, Wigmore had mixed
emotions about it, describing its benefits as "indirect and speculative"
and its obstruction as "plain and concrete," and warning that "it
ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle."1 67
There is little empirical evidence on the value of evidentiary
privileges in promoting the free flow of information in the cases of
protected relationships.' Perhaps the best that can be said is that
there is little evidence that the privileges are not effective in providing
such protection. Intuitively, Wigmore's utilitarian justification works
fairly well in the case of the lawyer-client privilege. One could
certainly envision situations in which the absence of a privilege would
make a lawyer much less aggressive in seeking information and that
such inhibition would adversely affect her representation of her
client. 69 Similarly, as the Court noted in Jaffee, the absence of a
privilege could chill communications between psychotherapist and
patient."' As will be noted later, despite the Court's dictum in Jaffee,
164. 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302 (J.S. Mill, Ed. 1827).
165. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE supra note 163, § 2291, at 555.
166. I& at 556. Wigmore also had modestly more faith in lawyers to avoid "treachery"
than did Bentham. Id. at 556-57.
167. Id. at 557-58. Frontal attacks on the attorney-client privilege are not confined to
legal history. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Ci. L. REV. 1
(1998).
168. There have been a few limited empirical studies of the effectiveness of privileges
but little conclusive can be gained from them. E.g. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S.
Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1982); Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and
Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE
L. J. 1226 (1962). In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998), the Court
referred to empirical information with regard to the likely effect of the posthumous
termination of the attorney-client privilege as "scant and inconclusive." The same might
easily be said about privileges generally.
169. See Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1476-77 (1985).
170. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
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there may also be similar utilitarian justifications for a general
physician-patient privilege.17'
The rationale is somewhat less compelling in the case of the
marital communication privilege and others such as the clergy
privilege. Arguably, a spouse is less likely than, say, an attorney or
physician, to be aware of the existence of a legal privilege and the
maintenance of legal confidentiality is thus perhaps an insignificant
factor in fostering communications between husbands and wives."
Even in the absence of a legal privilege, the compulsion of one's
religion might be sufficient to encourage full communications with a
member of the clergy.
But there are other justifications for the law of privilege that can
be more readily applied to communications with clergy and between
spouses. Those same justifications also give added weight to the
privileges that may have primarily a utilitarian basis.
Many modern day writers justify the creation and continued
existence of privilege on the protection they give to individual
privacy. A person has a right, inherent in our society if not
constitutionally based,"' to consult with various people without fear
that the government, through its court system, will compel that the
subject matter of that consultation be disclosed without the speaker's
consent.74 As one writer, Professor Thomas Krattenmaker, puts it
privacy is the "voluntary and secure control one possesses over
communication of information about oneself .... [R]ejection of a
claim of privilege destroys the claimant's control over the breadth of
the audience receiving personal information as well as his control
over the timing and conditions of its release."' 75  He adds that
recognizing a claim of personal privilege embodies the fundamental
respect which society does, and should hold for the right of privacy.
76
171. See infra text accompanying notes 241-44.
172. See Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, Advisory Committee's Note, 56
F.R.D. 183,245-46 (1972).
173. See discussion in Dudley, supra note 70, at 1818-21. The journalist's privilege has
been viewed as rooted in the First Amendment even if not required by it. See Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Shoen v.
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). See also infra text accompanying notes 245-49.
174. See Black, supra note 34, emphasizing privacy and the need to assess privilege in
the context of a particular case.
175. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L. J. 613, 649 (1976). Krattenmaker
also argues: "By providing individuals with a tool to control the limits of the dissemination
of personal information they choose to disclose, testimonial privileges serve as important
protectors of the right of privacy." Id. at 651-52.
176. Id. at 654. Krattenmaker adds:
Recognition of a particular confidant's claim of privilege also upholds and
reinforces that person's right of privacy. Finally, since society cannot protect
against all abridgements of that right it becomes more, not less, imperative that
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Closely related to this generalized privacy concept, is the argument of
Professors Wright and Graham, that "in a society with equalitarian
pretensions," individuals must be free to resist the power of the state
to compel information in certain instances."
privacy be preserved whenever possible. Although society cannot guarantee the
inviolability of every man's every attempt to strike his own balance between
secrecy and participation, this is no reason to unleash judges to compel
divulgence of every confidence they can discover. For these reasons, societal
approval of an invoked testimonial privilege enhances everyone's security and
privacy.
Id. See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual
Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REv. 511 (1994).
177. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5422, at 675-76.
Given the political nature of privileges, it is not surprising that in most states the
allocation of these exemptions tends to follow the distribution of political power
in contemporary society. Powerful institutions-such as the church, government,
and corporations-and professions that primarily serve a monied clientele (and
are therefore thought prestigious)-doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists-are
given privileges to preserve their secrets and those of their clients. But
professions and institutions that serve analogous functions for working class
people are denied such protection; compare, for example, the treatment of
communications to tax lawyers with those to storefront tax preparers.
Id. at 675-76 (footnotes omitted). Wright and Graham's treatment of the question
engendered a lively debate between them and the Harvard students authoring the Note,
supra note 169. The Harvard student note seeks to reconcile the traditional instrumental
justification with the privacy rationale, providing a "full utilitarian framework." 98 HARV.
L. REV. at 1484.
In sum, when deciding whether to create a new privilege or to abolish an existing
one, decisionmakers should weigh both the beneficial behavioral effects of
privileges and the immediate benefits of protecting confidentiality against the
cost of privileges to the correct disposal of litigation. Generally, the beneficial
behavioral effects involve the systemic encouragement of communication, and
the immediate benefits include the protection of privacy. But privileges can have
both immediate benefits beyond the protection of privacy and systemic benefits
apart from the encouragement of communications. All of these benefits merit
consideration in a full utilitarian justification of privilege law.
Id. at 1486. The Harvard note authors reject the power analysis put forth in Wright and
Graham and see legitimate choice making by legislatures in formulating privilege rules.
Id. at 1496-97. Wright and Graham vigorously defend their use of the power argument.
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5422.1 (Supp. 2000).
We can happily endorse the statement of the [Harvard note] authors that in
advancing the interests of the powerful at the expense of the majority "privilege
law is no different from * * * most law in a democratic society." It is precisely
because we reject the debased notion of democracy that animates this statement
that we believe that those who have a more egalitarian and less procedural view
of politics can profitably labor in the relative obscurity of evidence law. We
leave it to those who care little about distributive justice to comfort themselves
with the knowledge that "our existing system of privilege is legitimate" because it
well "expresses the overall balance of power in society."
Id at 409-10 (footnotes to Harvard note omitted).
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Another nonutilitarian rationale for privilege is that it gives
recognition to the duty of loyalty owed by the recipient of
information to the person confiding in her. Ethics rules make
confidentiality a duty of the professional.78 A failure to protect such
communications via a testimonial privilege would adversely affect the
professional in the performance of her duties.'79 In the marital
communications context, the abrogation of a privilege may force
breaches in spousal loyalty.
The best arguments for the maintenance of privilege are those
that are based on both instrumental considerations and those arising
from considerations of privacy, human dignity and loyalty."° Lawyer-
client communications should be protected because the free flow of
information between them may be enhanced by the existence of the
privilege. In addition, an individual ought to have someone to advise
her on matters of legal urgency without the fear that her
communicated thoughts will be exposed by subpoena. The power of
the state ought not extend to interference with the relationship
between client and counsel. Similar arguments can be made with
regard to other privileges. For example, the psychotherapist or the
physician, like the attorney, relies upon a free flow of information.
Even if such communications are enhanced only a little by the
existence of the privilege, the protection may be justified when one
also considers that public exposure of most such communications,
even when needed to resolve a legal dispute, would be repugnant to
most of society.
If the only excuse for evidentiary privileges is that they are
instruments created to protect certain relationships, a strong
argument can and has been made that the law of the jurisdiction
having the closest connection to those relationships should be
178. See, e.g., MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (1983). With regard to the
application of similar principles to the clergy, see Comment, Should Clergy Hold the
Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171, 186 (1998).
179. With regard to the privilege and attorney loyalty see David J. Fried, Too High a
Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes
and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 491-92 (1986); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351 (1989). With regard to the privilege and
psychotherapist or physician loyalty, see Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the
"Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY
L.J. 263, 271 (1982); Note, Protecting Confidential Communications Between a
Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CAm. U. L. REV. 963 (1997).
180. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 673, note that the value of such non-
instrumental arguments is that they are not subject to disproof by evidence, although they
require agreement on values. The authors further note instrumental arguments are better
suited to defending governmental and corporate privileges, where questions of human
dignity are not as readily apparent.
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controlling.8' Under this analysis, state policy protecting the
relationships it created should govern even in federal court and even
in federal-question cases. On the other hand, the alternative
rationales for the creation of a privilege (the recognition of privacy of
individuals, human autonomy and the loyalty of the recipient of
information to the speaker) transcend the power of those who create
or supervise the relationship. The need for confidentiality based on
these considerations must be weighed against the need for truth in the
tribunal before which evidence is sought to be excluded. The court
system in which the trial occurs has a right and obligation to
determine whether the suppression of relevant evidence is justified.
The decision of that court system should be made without regard to
who created the relationship."
Rule 501 preserves the ability of the federal courts to make these
kinds of decisions. Except in cases in which the federal courts serve
simply as the forum in which state disputes are resolved in diversity of
citizenship cases, there is to be a federal law of privilege
implementing federal policy. The next question is whether the
recognition of nonutilitarian rationales also supports the codification
of privileges as opposed to their development in the common-law
process envisioned by the current federal rule.
Arguments can be constructed that a common-law approach, in
which the application of the law of privilege is determined on a case-
by-case basis, is better suited to the protection of privacy rights and
other considerations. The courts can tailor and adjust the law of
privilege to meet special circumstances. The law can develop to meet
modern circumstances in a flexible, common sense manner,
unfettered by political considerations that necessarily go into the
legislative process that would be involved the creation of a privilege
code.
There are persuasive counterweights to such arguments.
Fairness and freedom from external political pressures have certainly
not been universally present in our judicial rulemaking. For example,
judges are as vulnerable as legislators to a "let's get tough on crime"
mood in the nation" More importantly, if there is to be a federal law
of privilege and a significant justification for such a law is the
181. See Krattenmaker, supra note 175; Dudley, supra note 70.
182. Even those who generally advocate following state rules of privilege recognize that
there are instances in which federal policy is so strong that federal law ought to govern
even in the presence of a contrary state rule. See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 70, at 1826-28
(where the author agrees that the federal courts appropriately rejected a state privilege for
legislative acts in United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980)).
183. See Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the Question: A Study
of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641, 694 (1992).
See also notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
protection of confidentiality needed to preserve privacy or a duty of
loyalty, such a societal goal is likely to be better served by codified
rules rather than by the slower and less certain process of court
decision. The more predictable one's entitlement to privacy is, the
more secure one can feel in exercising that privacy. If the case law is
muddled and rights unclear, one's willingness to exercise a right to
privacy may be effectively restrained.84 There is no freedom to
communicate with the intent to keep a matter confidential if there is
doubt as to whether that confidence will in fact be respected. To be
sure, not all confidences, even those involving persons who may have
privileges under some circumstances, will be honored under either a
common-law or code approach. The value of an individual's interest
in any given situation must always be weighed against the judicial
system's interests in having access to "every man's evidence."' 85
However, under a code approach, more certainty can be added to the
protections that are to be given. If there are limitations on privacy,
let those limits be clearly set forth so that the communicants can
know where they stand. Where judicial judgments need to be made
as in the case of privileges that are less than absolute, let the
standards be articulated in a clear and accessible manner. Moreover,
the parties and the courts whose access to evidence is restricted by
privileges are also entitled to firm and understandable rules governing
what is admissible. Such rules now exist for most of the law of
evidence. The addition of codified rules of privilege could bring
greater clarity to another important area of evidence law.
C. Federal Rules as Models
State court systems have traditionally turned to federal
codifications as models, or as one writer put it, the federal rules are
"leadership rules." '186 This has been true of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and despite some predictions to the contrary," of the
Rules of Evidence. Even the controversial and rejected federal rules
of privilege have served, at least in some measure, as models for half
184. "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1996).
185. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40,50 (1980).
186. See Charles L. Black, Jr., supra note 34, at 48: "Federal Rules are leadership rules
and ought to lead in the right direction, which to me would be in the direction of greater
rather than less protection of personal privacy....
187. See Weinberg, supra note 34.
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the states.1" As discussed above, state courts are using federal cases
to help them define their law of privilege."
An argument can be made that there is no need for a federal
model for privilege rules; the Uniform Rules of Evidence can serve as
that guide. Indeed, it is probably inaccurate to say that the states
have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Most have in fact
adopted the Uniform Rules. The Uniform Rules are based on the
Federal Rules-including privilege rules that adopt in large measure
Article V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence rejected by Congress."
However, unlike the Proposed Federal Rules, the Uniform Rules
contain a marital communications privilege"9' and provide for an
optional general physician-patient privilege." Given the existence of
these provisions, the Uniform Rules accurately reflect principles
common to most states. Nevertheless, based on past history, it is safe
to predict that a new codification of the federal law of privilege would
make greater inroads on state law than have the Uniform Rules. A
new set of federal privilege rules should be attractive both to those
states that have rejected the original proposed privilege rules, as
incorporated into the Uniform Rules, and, as a model for
amendment, to the states that have adopted those rules. Assuming
that some national uniformity of laws of privilege is a good thing, a
federal codification seems likely to lead us closer to that goal.93
D. Why Not Codify?
At or near the time of congressional consideration of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, some commentators made cogent arguments
against any codification of evidence rules at all. 94 Those arguments
188. Twenty-four states have adopted at least some of the proposed federal privilege
rules. ALA. R. EVID. 501 to 512A; ALASKA R. EVID. 501 to 512; ARK. R. EvID. 501 to
512; COLO. R. EVID. 501; DEL. R. EVID. 501 to 513; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.501-90.510
(West 2001); HAW. R. EVID. 501 to 513; IDAHO R. EVID. 501 to 520; IND. R. EVID. 501;
KY. R EVID. 501 to 511; ME. R. EVID. 501 to 513; Miss. R. EVID. 501 to 505; MONT. R.
EVID. 501 to 505; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-501 to 27-508 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.015
to 49.405 (2001); N.M. R. EVID. 11-501 to 11-514; N.D. R. EVID. 501 to 512; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2501 to 2513 (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAVS §§ 19-13-1 to -19-13-32
(Michie 2001); TENN. R. EVID. 501; TEX. R. E VID. 501 to 513; UTAH R. EVID. 501 to 508;
VT. R. EVID. 501 to 512; WIs. STAT. §§ 905.01 to 905.15 (2001).
189. See text accompanying notes 109-119, supra.
190. See UNIF. R. EVID. 501 et seq. Uniform Rules based on the Proposed Federal
Rules were first drafted in 1974 and were amended in 1986 and 1999.
191. UNIF. R. EVID. 504.
192. UNIF. R. EVID. 503.
193. See Degnan, supra note 48, at 301. No advocate of privileges, Degnan nonetheless
wrote: "Thoughtfully formulated privilege rules in nondiversity cases may influence the
states to re-examine their own approaches to confidences." Id.
194. See text accompanying notes 37-39, supra.
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may have been plausible when they were set forth, but the
development of the law since the adoption of current rule 501 has
refuted most of them.195
Professor Louise Weinberg believed that trial lawyers were more
concerned about uniformity of evidence law between state and
federal courts than about uniformity within the federal courts.96 She
predicted, based upon the failure of a significant number of states to
adopt either the original Uniform Rules of Evidence" or the earlier
Model Code of Evidence,9 ' that the Federal Rules would not develop
into a significant trend.'99 Although her argument was reasonable, she
turned out to be wrong. The Federal Rules of Evidence have become
the standard. New lawyers must demonstrate their knowledge of
those rules in virtually every state through the Multi-State Bar
Examination. 0
The idea that each federal court should mold its privilege rules to
meet state law is no longer a viable option-the development of a
federal law of privilege under Rule 501 has put that possibility to rest.
The confusion of parallel evidence systems has not proven to be a
problem-the federal system has dominated and will continue to
dominate the law of evidence in general and the law of privilege in
particular.
Professor Weinberg also argued that the Federal Rules would fail
as a model at least in part because they failed to simplify the common
law.Y Whether or not the Federal Rules simplify the common law is
a matter of debate. But whatever the answer to that question, the
rules were satisfactory enough to the states that a substantial majority
have adopted them almost verbatim as their own." Professor
Weinberg simply underestimated the persuasive influence of the
federal system on the states.
Like Professor Weinberg, but writing to support the general
desirability of federal rules of evidence, Professor, now Judge, Jack
Weinstein recognized the pressures for conforming federal law to the
195. Not all the commentary in favor of judicial development of the law of privilege has
been limited to the time of the rejection of the proposed rules. See Miller, supra note 64.
196. Weinberg, supra note 34.
197. The first Uniform Rules of Evidence were approved by the National Conference
and the American Bar Association in 1953. They were superseded by the rules based
upon the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1974. See note 190, supra.
198. The Model Code of Evidence was promulgated by the American Law Institute in
1942.
199. Weinberg, supra note 34, at 613.
200. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Multi-State Bar Examination, available at
http://www.ncbex.orgtestlmbe/specs.htm_(Feb. 4,2002).
201. Weinberg, supra note 34, at 607-14.
202. See supra note 147.
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law of the state. 3 He noted that the bar is a state bar, the bulk of
litigation takes place in state courts, training for the bar is in state
oriented law schools, judges and lawyers are more familiar with state
than federal practice and much of the substantive law, even in the
federal courts, is within the state sphere.0  A uniform federal system
diverging from the state system requires familiarity with two sets of
procedural rules.205 Judge Weinstein then proceeded to refute his own
straw arguments:
Nevertheless, looked at from the vantage point of Washington, the
pressure towards uniform rules of evidence in the federal courts is
great. It would make it easier to move judges from state to state to
meet temporary litigation pressures and thus would accommodate
the strong administrative tendency towards a more integrated and
efficient federal judicial system. It gives recognition to a growing
national bar practicing in the federal courts and the desirability of
making it easier for both lawyers and their national clients to find
an equal grade of justice administered by familiar procedure in any
federal court in the country. Where federal substantive policies are
being enforced, a more uniform policy is fairer and more
predictable and is likely to strengthen and bind the nation together.
And, finally, much of the state law of evidence is simply
unsatisfactory.206
Judge Weinstein's comments are even more apt when applied to
the situation as it exists more than thirty years later. National
litigation is common-indeed, it virtually dominates the civil dockets
of many federal districts. The growing national bar described by
Judge Weinstein has grown exponentially. If his comments were and
are convincing in connection with the law of evidence generally, most
of them are also applicable to the law of privilege. The only comment
whose applicability to privilege is debatable is that state law is
"unsatisfactory."
Other arguments that have been made against the codification of
the law of evidence generally can be applied to the law of privilege.
Perhaps the most politically effective arguments against an evidence
code have been made in New York, where the state has resisted
adopting such a code for more than a hundred years. Some of the
arguments made in opposition to a New York evidence code are
particularly apt when applied to privileges. Opponents have argued,
for example, that an evidence code would freeze the law of evidence
and make it inflexible. Others opined that codification would
203. Jack B. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of
Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 353,358-59 (1969).
204. Id. at 358.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 359.
207. Salken, supra note 183, at 684-87.
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politicize the law of evidence. This last argument has been made with
particular vehemence by the criminal defense bar based upon a fear
that anticrime sentiment would favor a code that leaned toward
admissibility of more evidence harmful to the accused.
Such arguments have been largely negated by experience under
the Federal Rules and state versions of them. The law of evidence
has not been frozen, but has moved with the times.' 9 As noted
above,21" judges, as well as legislators, are susceptible to the public
mood of fear of crime.2 ' Moreover, the influence of special interest
groups is not confined to legislative actions. Such groups may inject
themselves into the judicial process through amicus briefs filed in
cases likely to have an impact on them.2 Nevertheless, the concerns
expressed about codification must be taken into account in the
drafting of any code. There must be flexibility and there must be
vigilance on the part of the drafters to maintain fairness, especially in
the criminal justice system.
In addition to these arguments against codification, there are also
the policy arguments referred to above in favor of federal
recognition of state privileges, as opposed to the existence of a
separate and potentially conflicting federal rule. These are the
strongly stated and well-articulated opinions that, because state law
creates and supervises most of the relationships subject to privileges,
federal courts should defer to state privilege laws, except in matters
where there is strong, countervailing federal policy.2 4  Such
arguments can be made whether or not the privilege rules are
codified.
Response to such arguments can be at two levels. First, there is
the equally good argument that general considerations of protection
of the privacy of individuals cut across any state interests in the
protection of particular relationships. As stated above, the federal
system ought to be able to decide whether to deprive itself of relevant
208. Id. at 696-703.
209. Id. at 687-90. Examples of the fluidity of the law of evidence under the Federal
Rules can be found in several areas, especially concerning expert testimony, see, e.g.,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), or in the admission in evidence
of modern communications such as e-mail, see, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d
1318 (11th Cir. 2000). See also Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common
Law?-Recent American Codifications, and their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's
Subsequent Development, 1994 Wisc. L. REv. 1119.
210. See text accompanying note 183, supra.
211. See Steven Zeidman, Who Needs an Evidence Code?: The New York Court of
Appeals's Radical Re-evaluation of Hearsay, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 211, 251 (1999); Jack
B. Weinstein, supra note 203, at 359.
212. Fourteen amicus briefs were filed in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 3 (1996).
213. See text accompanying note 181, supra.
214. See Krattenmaker, supra note 175; Dudley, supra note 70.
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evidence based upon principles that weigh the need for the evidence
against the principles of human rights and dignity that are reflected in
the creation of the privilege.215
Second, the decision to substitute the judgment of the federal
system for that of the states has already been made by Congress.
There is a federal law of privilege. Except in diversity2 cases,
deference is not to be given to the privilege laws of the states. 16 The
only question is whether we can make the federal law of privilege
better than it has been.
IV. The Nature of Codification
It is not the function of this article to draft particular privilege
rules or to advocate for or against particular privileges or applications
of privileges. However, there are some basic policy determinations
that should guide the drafting of any such rules. Following is an
attempt to identify some of such considerations.
A. The Need and Justification for Rules that Permit the Creation of New
Privileges
If codification is in fact a useful thing to do, what kind of
codification should there be? Specifically, should there be an attempt
to codify all privileges, as in California,217 or rather an attempt to
codify some and leave the possibility of the creation of others to the
courts, as in some other states?28 The rejected federal privilege rules
purported to close the door on judicial development of new
privileges. Such a limitation would stifle protections that may be
fully justified. The need for such protection may arise in situations
that cannot now be foreseen, especially if the law of privilege is based
upon nonutilitarian rationales. The courts should have a role, much
like that exercised by the Supreme Court in Jaffeeno to develop
privileges. The residual exception to the hearsay rule has left that
215. See text accompanying note 182, supra.
216. In a few non-diversity cases, federal courts have felt obliged to consider state
policy in determining the existence of a privilege, even though ultimate decision had to be
a federal one under FED. R. EVID. 501. See, e.g., In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.
1981); Sabree v. United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D.
422 (D. Mass. 1989). The approach of those courts need not change under a codified
scheme of the kind envisioned in this article. State policy may still be considered by the
federal courts in determining whether a non-codified federal privilege should be
recognized.
217. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 911-20 (West 2001).
218. See, e.g., AZ. R. EVID. 501; CONN. C. EVID. Rule 501; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1,
Rule 501 (2000).
219. Proposed Federal Rule 501.
220. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
rule open to case-by-case development. 2' Although one might
disagree with the decisions of individual courts in the case of the
residual hearsay exceptions,' such a dynamic development of the law
is, in principle, worthwhile.'
The codification of privileges with a provision that would permit
the judicial development of new privileges would also prevent the
resurrection of a notion that arose after the adoption of existing Rule
501. There was a school of thought that suggested that the
congressional action in adopting Rule 501 put a bridle on the creation
of privileges, at least with regard to privileges that did not exist in
judicial opinions at the time of the adoption of the rule. " The strong
preference expressed throughout the Federal Rules of Evidence in
favor of the admissibility of evidence seemed to give some fuel to the
imposition of such a limitation.'m To some extent, the Jaffee case put
to rest that thinking. However, Jaffee involved a privilege that had
been included in the Proposed Federal Rules. 6 The Court in Jaffee
noted the existence of the proposed rule in support of its argument
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized.' In
light of Jaffee and the Federal Rules' expressed preference for the
admissibility of evidence, it would be prudent to include in any
codification of the privilege rules a specific provision permitting their
judicial expansion.
B. Adherence to Generally Accepted Principles of the Law of Privilege
There is no uniform view on any of the privileges as they exist in
state or federal law. However, the drafters of any federal codification
would do well to attempt to discover common principles that cut
across state and federal privilege rules and to reflect those principles
in their drafting. The recently amended Uniform Rules of Evidence2s
221. FED. R. EVID. 807.
222. See, e.g., United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Earles, 113 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1997) (grand jury testimony admitted under residual hearsay
exception, now FED. R. EVID. 807).
223. The existence of a rule that would permit the judicial development of new
privileges resolves, at least in part, the concerns expressed in Miller, supra note 64, that
closed-ended privilege rules stifle the dynamic judicial process.
224. See, e.g., discussion in Imwinkelried, supra note 176, at 524-29 and Capra, supra
note 85.
225. Imwinkelried, supra note 176.
226. Proposed Federal Rule 504.
227. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14 (1996).
228. See UNiF. R. EVID. 501- 511 (1999).
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and the treatment of the attorney-client privilege in the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers"9 are useful starting places.
Adherence to commonly agreed upon concepts in the law of
evidence has made the other Federal Rules of Evidence largely
acceptable to the states. Similarly, if federal rules of privilege are
intended to lead, they should be sufficiently reflective of state policy
so as to make themselves attractive to the states. If states adopt the
federal privilege rules, as they accepted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the current Federal Rules of Evidence, the differences
in state and federal practice and policy will diminish, perhaps to the
level of triviality.230
This is not to say that federal rules of privilege need be a simple
restatement or that significant federal policy concerns should be
ignored. As eminent writers stated in connection with the rejected
privilege rules: "That many rules of evidence are important and have
a substantial effect in reaching an adjudication does not take them
outside rulemaking. Rulemaking is not confined to the picayune." 3'
Rather, the hope would be that the federal rules would lead and the
state systems would follow.
C. What Privileges to Include?
The political success or failure of any federal codification of the
law of privilege may depend on the choices made as to what privileges
are codified. Some of the harshest criticism of the rejected Federal
Rules of Evidence dealing with privileges centered on the failure of
those rules to include a general physician-patient privilege, which did
not exist in federal law at the time,.2 or a marital communications
privilege, which did. 3 The emphasis that the Supreme Court put on
the universal state recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
229. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers §§118-135 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1 1996). See also amendment to §129 in Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1998).
230. See Rothstein, supra note 33, at 130-31. Professor Rothstein argues for federal
rules of privilege even in diversity cases:
Infringement of state policies, difficulties encountered by lawyers practicing in
both state and federal courts, and forum shopping, can be minimized if the
federal privilege rules are drawn in general accord with the policies behind
prevailing state privileges where such policies seem at all justifiable. Moreover,
divergence between state and federal law will diminish as states imitate federal
rules.
231. Moore & Bendix, supra note 10, at 12.
232. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); discussion supra in text accompanying
notes 29-30,56.
233. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); discussion supra in text
accompanying notes 28,55.
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is strong evidence that at least that Court places strong weight on
issues of national conformity on the existence of a privilege.'
Congress's rejection of the proposed federal rules on privilege, which
failed to include privileges generally accepted by the states, is
evidence that Congress is equally concerned with the same issue.'5
The inclusion of a marital communications privilege would seem
essential both to political success of any codification in Congress and
to the attractiveness of the code to the states. The existence of a
marital communications privilege was recognized by the Supreme
Court in the Trammel 16 case and its existence has been confirmed in
a number of more recent lower court cases.37 The entrenchment of
the marital communications privilege as part of the federal common
law and its virtually universal adoption by the states" make it an ideal
candidate for inclusion in any codification.
On the other hand, the marital or spousal testimony privilege is a
less obvious component of any new set of rules. The Supreme Court
in Trammel expressed a clear lack of enthusiasm for such a privilege,
in part influenced by the far less than unanimous and eroding
reception of that privilege in the states. 9  Proposed Rule 505
contained a spousal testimony privilege but not a marital
communications privilege. It would not be unreasonable for a new
codification to take the opposite approach and include a marital
communications privilege but not one for spousal testimony. "
Although the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
in Jaffee makes such a privilege a likely part of any codification, the
existence of a general physician-patient privilege is another story.
Although the absence of such a privilege was the subject of massive
criticism at the time of the Proposed Federal Rules, there is still no
general physician-patient privilege in federal common law.2 '
234. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1996).
235. See discussion supra in Part I.
236. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
237. E.g., United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hill,
967 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1985).
238. See 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5571 (1989).
239. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48 n.9.
240. The Uniform Rules of Evidence promulgated in 1974 provided for a marital
communications privilege, but not one for spousal testimony. See UNIF. R. EVID. 2d 504.
The Uniform Rules were amended in 1986 to add a marital testimony privilege that may
be invoked by the spouse of an accused in a criminal case. UNIF. R. EVID. 3d 504. The
1999 amendments to the rule maintain both privileges.
241. E.g., Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moore,
970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1988). Wright
and Graham agree that the federal courts have noted their rejection of a general
physician-patient privilege, but question whether there truly is any "long tradition of
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Furthermore, the Court in Jaffee implicitly rejected such a privilege,
distinguishing physical examinations from mental ones based upon
the physical examinations reliance on objective information.42
The Court in Jaffee was greatly influenced by the fact that all
fifty states and the District of Columbia have a psychotherapist
privilege in one form or another. Forty states also have a general
physician-patient privilege. ' 3 Furthermore, the Court's distinction in
Jaffee between physical and mental examination is questionable.
Doctors examining patients for physical ailments often must rely
upon subjective information, such as descriptions of pain.2'
If the federal rules are, at least to some extent, to be reflective of
a general state of the law in the states, the argument for a general
physician-patient privilege is strong. In addition, from a political
perspective, the drafters of a privilege code would do well to
remember the history of the rejection of the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence dealing with privilege.
The absence of a journalist's privilege from the rejected Federal
Rules was somewhat less controversial, but nevertheless provoked
responses, especially and not surprisingly from representatives of the
media.2 4' At least a majority of states have such a privilege either by
rejection of the physician-patient privilege by federal courts." WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 31, §5522, at 69.
242. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). See discussion in text accompanying notes
92-108, supra. See also discussion in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5522, at 18
(2001 Supp.).
243. ALASKA R. EVID. 504; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2235 (2001); ARK. R. EVID. 503;
CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(d) (West
2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(o) (West 2001); DEL. R. EVID. 503; HAW. R.
EVID. 504; IDAHO R. EVID. 503; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (West 2001); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (West 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10(3)(c) (West 2001); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-427 (2000); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510 (West 2001); ME. R. EVID. 503;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (West 2001); MISS. R. EvID. 503; Mo. ANN. STAT. §
491.060(5) (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (West 2001); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 27-504 (Michie 2001); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.225 (Michie 2001); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (2001); NJ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-22.2 (West 2001); N.M. R.
EVID. 11-504; N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (2001); N.D.
R. EVID. 503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
2503 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.235 (2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (West
2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-24 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-7 (Michie 2001);
TEx. R. EVID. 509; UTAH R. EVID. 506; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Michie 2001); VT. R.
EVID. 503; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(a)(4) (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
905.04 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (Michie 2001).
244. See, e.g., James S. Lapcevic, Pain Management, ch. 37 in AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
LEGAL MEDICINE, LEGAL MEDICINE (1998).
245. See note 57, supra, and accompanying text. The pleas of the journalism profession
did not go entirely unheeded in the congressional response. Congressman Hungate, the
chair of the House Committee, commented:
statute or judicial decision.246 Most federal courts looking at the issue
have now adopted such a qualified journalist's privilege in one form
or another.247
The significant problem with the common-law development of a
journalist's privilege in the federal courts is its unevenness. Not all
circuits recognize even a qualified privilege, at least in connection
with grand jury proceedings.248 In addition, there are a myriad of
differences in the application of the privilege among the various
circuit and district court decisions.249
Nevertheless, despite the lack of uniformity and the uncertainties
of application, the journalist's privilege is now engrained in both the
general law of privilege in this country and in what has become the
federal common law. Although inclusion of a newsperson's privilege
in any code is not as politically compelling as the marital
communications privilege or a general physician-patient privilege,
the comments to Congress in the controversy over the proposed rules
and the subsequent recognition of the privilege in the courts indicate
that its inclusion in a new code could be an attractive addition.
Other, more novel privileges, should be left to common-law or
subsequent statutory development. For example, less than one-third
[T]he Supreme Court's rules of evidence contained no rule of privilege for a
newspaperperson. The language of rule 501 permits the courts to develop a
privilege for newspaperpeople on a case-by-case basis. The language cannot be
interpreted as a congressional expression in favor of having no such privilege, nor
can the conference action be interpreted as denying to newspeople any
protection they may have from State newsperson's privilege laws.
120 Cong. Rec. 40891(1974). See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5426, at 712.
246. Id. § 5426; 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29, § 213 at 476 (citing L
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 975 and nn. 35-36 (2d ed. 1988)).
247. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. LaRouche
Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988).
248. In re Grand Jury Proceedings 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993).
249. The kind of problems include questions of who is a journalist qualifying for the
privilege (see In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998) (wrestling promoter not entitled
to privilege); In re Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998) (academic investigator entitled
to privilege); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (investigative author entitled to
privilege); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (documentary
filmmaker entitled to privilege)), whether the information sought is confidential (see
United States v. La Rouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988) (information need
not be confidential); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (same);
Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998) (no privilege for
nonconfidential information); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998) (same)),
and whether different rules apply in cases involving testimony before a grand jury (see In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993) (no qualified privilege in criminal
case); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (no need to distinguish between
civil and criminal cases although the weight given to various factors may be different)).
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of the states have an accountant-client privilege." No federal court
has recognized it in a federal-question or criminal case."5 There are
various strong arguments against the accountant-client privilege.5 2
Furthermore, it is not embedded into the general principles of
common law in anywhere close to a majority of the states. Even
those states that have enacted such a privilege have seldom had
occasion to construe it.' 3 If there is to be such a privilege in the
future, it should be left to separate common-law development.2
The existence of several other privileges has been argued by
litigants and witnesses. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected a
privilege for academic peer review' and a state legislator's
privilege.26 Lower courts have rejected other privileges including
those for communications between parents and children' as well as a
privilege based on the protective function of secret service agents.2
A wide variety of other privileges has been adopted by state
legislatures 9 and suggested in the literature!" Some have been
recognized in an occasional federal court opinion.26  None has
achieved general acceptance as part of the federal common law of
privilege.2
250. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5427; See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Gussin, 714 A.2d 188, 192 (Md. 1998).
251. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Frederick, 182
F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999); In re International Horizons, Inc. 689 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1982).
252. Often the information received by the accountant is of a kind intended to be made
public. It almost invariably involves financial or business, rather than more personal
issues. Accountants have responsibility to provide assurance to third parties or the public
generally that transcends a duty of confidentiality to their clients. See United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., supra note 88; 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29, § 214
(1994); WRIGHT AND GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5427.
253. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 31, § 5427, at 812.
254. See similar arguments in Dudley, supra note 70 and WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 31, § 5427.
255. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
256. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
257. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997).
258. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
259. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 76.2.
260. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government:
Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978); Paul
Nejelski & Lindsey Miller Lerman, A Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege, 1971 WIS.
L. REV. 1085; Note, The Constitutionality of an Absolute Privilege for Rape Crisis
Counseling, 30 B.C. L. REV. 411 (1989); Comment, The Medical Review Committee
Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179 (1988).
261. See, e.g., Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984)
(scientific researcher-subject privilege); Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc. 157
F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (self-critical analysis); Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970) (medical review committee).
262. See, e.g., S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USDA, 170 F. Supp. 2d 931 (D. Ariz.
2000) (no general scientific researcher privilege); Spencer Savings Bank v. Excell Mortg.
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Like the accountant's privileges, such innovations in the law
should be left to common-law development, such as that which
ultimately resulted in recognition of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Jaffee. Alternatively, if nationwide consensus on the need
for protection by other privileges emerges, Congress may see fit to
add those privileges to the codification.
D. The Federal Rules of Privilege Should Govern Cases That Involve Both
Federal and State Issues
The time has also come to deal finally with what was predicted to
be a thorny problem in the drafting of current Rule 501. Particularly
in the Senate, great concern was expressed as to the law of privilege
to be followed if there are both federal and state claims involved in
the litigation. Rule 501, if read literally, could require the application
of federal privilege law to federal claims and state privilege law to
state claims in the same case.' If one law permits introduction of the
evidence, the policy of the other law would be frustrated.
After the House committee had rejected the Advisory
Committee's proposed rules and substituted a rule in the form of
present rule 501, the Senate substituted what it labeled a "technical
amendment"2' that would have provided more clearly that state
privilege law was to apply in diversity cases and federal privilege law
in all other cases.25 The Senate Report also opined that in cases filed
as diversity actions, but which contained a claim or defense in which
federal law supplies the rule of decision, the "rule favoring reception
of the evidence should be applied. ' '266 The House conferees were
unconvinced of the seriousness of the problem and the House
provision ultimately won the day. The Conference Report, although
Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835 (D. N.J. 1997) (no general self-critical analysis privilege); Syposs v.
United States, 179 F.R.D. 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (no general medical peer review
privilege).
263. The second sentence of rule 501 provides for State law to apply whenever State
law "supplies the rule of decision." Thus, on its face, the language of the rule applies
whenever there is a state claim, regardless of whether there is also a federal claim in the
same case.
264. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6-7 (1974).
265. Under the Senate version of Rule 501, the second sentence would have read:
However, in civil actions and proceedings arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28
U.S.C. § 1335, or between citizens of different States and removed under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) the privilege of a witness, person, government, state or political
subdivision thereof is determined in accordance with State law, unless with
respect to the particular claim or defense, Federal law supplies the rule of
decision.
Id. at 2. See also Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil
Litigation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 923, 959 (1975).
266. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 12. n. 17.
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seemingly recognizing that the language of the rule might call for
different privilege law to apply to different aspects of the case, states
that in "nondiversity jurisdiction civil cases, federal privilege law will
generally apply." 267
Despite the concerns in Congress and by some commentators,2s
the courts have had little trouble with the issue. The most frequently
cited case in which such an issue arose is a district court decision,
Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp.26 9 where the court had before it
"primarily a federal-question case," with state claims.o The question
was whether state or federal law or both should apply.2" The court in
Perrignon noted the practical problem: if the communication is
privileged under state law but not federal law, and admitted under
federal law, the "basic purpose of the privilege is defeated."2 2 To
resolve the dilemma, the court applied the federal law of attorney-
client privilege, despite the existence of both state and federal claims.
Other federal courts, including many of the courts of appeals
have reached similar conclusions.2' In most cases reaching the issues,
the balance of federal and state claims is similar to that in
Perrignon-the case is essentially a federal-question case but contains
some supplemental state claims. In some other cases, the courts have
articulated the principles expressed in Perrignon, but found little need
to worry about the issue in light of the similarity of federal and state
privilege law on the issues raised.74
In some instances, courts determining that the federal law of
privilege should apply to supplemental state claims have done so
using an approach essentially hostile to privileges. They have
articulated a policy like that suggested in the Senate Report-the law
favoring admissibility should govern.75  However, not all courts
267. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 4 (1974).
268. See discussions in Kaminsky, supra note 265; 2 SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA,
supra note 72, § 501.02[1], at 501-9 to 501-10.
269. 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
270. IL at 459.
271. Because of its resolution of the issue, the court never explores the question of what
effect the application of one law or the other would have on the issue in the case.
Presumably there would have been a difference or the parties would not have been
litigating the issue.
272. Id. at 458.
273. E.g., Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981);
Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1992); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136
(2d Cir. 1987).
274. See, e.g., Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997); Motley
v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); White v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 915 F.2d
1414 (10th Cir. 1990); Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fed. v. Philip Morris, 35 F.
Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
275. See, e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp. Inc. 671 F.2d 100 (3d
Cir. 1982); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1992); Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d
reaching the conclusion that the federal law of privilege applies to
supplemental claims have done so to avoid the application of a
privilege. For example in Caver v. City of Trenton,2 6 the court chose
to apply the broad federal law of psychotherapist privilege as set forth
in the Jaffee case to a supplemental state claim despite existence of a
more limited state court privilege.
Most courts considering the issue have applied federal privilege
law to supplemental state claims, but there are lower court cases to
the contrary. A few courts have held that there is no bright line rule
and that, under the facts of the case, the predominance of state policy
was such as to call for the application of state, rather than federal,
privilege law.' Some commentators have also argued for a policy
that would recognize that a single privilege law should be applied in a
case, but that there should be a balancing of interests and that the
state privilege should be applied in a "case where the state privilege
protects substantial state interests, and where the interests supporting
the Federal rule are not especially serious or sensitive." '
Although a balancing approach is attractive in the abstract, its
application would likely prove difficult. A bright line test, favoring
the federal law of privilege, would be far easier to apply and avoid the
almost metaphysical question of what issues predominate. Moreover,
there is an argument in favor of permitting the federal system to have
the final say as to what evidence ought to be admissible in its courts ' "
at least where doubt and confusion would otherwise exist.
Furthermore, a uniform and codified federal law of privilege, adopted
with due consideration of the general principles behind the law of
privilege generally, would less likely be in fundamental conflict with
state policy. The law as expressed in the vast majority of federal cases
dealing with the situation should be adopted as part of a codification
of the federal law of privilege: in cases with both federal and state
issues, federal privilege law should apply.'
57 (3d Cir. 2000); Doe v. Special Investigations Agency, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
276. 192 F.R.D. 154 (D. NJ. 2000).
277. See e.g., Platypus Wear, Inc. v. K.D. Co, Inc. 905 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Cal. 1995);
Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1976); see also Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574
(E.D. Wash. 1975) (state law would be applied, but state and federal law the same).
278. 2 SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 72, § 501.0212], at 501-10.
279. See note 10 and accompanying text, supra.
280. Although there does not seem to be any case law on the question, the question
may arise as to the applicable law of privilege with regard to a supplemental party, joined
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, where there are no federal claims applicable to that party. There
would seem to be no good reason to apply state law in such a case when it would not be
applied in other mixed state-federal claims cases. In addition to the arguments set forth in
the text, the governing law of privilege is not dependent on the person to whom it is
applicable. Non-parties claiming privilege are subject to the same law as parties. E.g., von
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E. Some Federal Privilege Rules Should Govern All Cases, Even Those
Involving State Law
Current Rule 501 states, as an absolute, that where state law
supplies the rule of decision, the law of privilege is to be determined
in accordance with state law. However, there are cases in which the
federal interest in applying its privilege law is so strong that federal
law should apply even in a diversity case.
In the case of the state secrets privilege, the courts in one circuit
have applied federal privilege law in diversity cases, without regard to
state law."' In all instances, the court applied the federal state secrets
privilege, based on the leading case of United States v. Reynolds,'
without a single reference to Rule 501 and the clear obligation to
follow state privilege law in a case where state law supplied the rule of
decision. Perhaps it seemed obvious to the court that the privilege
was so deeply rooted in federal policy that Congress could not have
intended the absence of a comparable state privilege to affect the
government's ability to protect sensitive information.
The same considerations should also apply in cases involving
other privileges that have as their purpose the protection of the
workings of the federal government, including privileges for
presidential deliberation. 3 deliberative processes of governmental
agencies and confidential law enforcement activity (such as the use
of informants).' Such privileges clearly exist for utilitarian purposes
with strong federal policy underlying their existence. Indeed, the
relationship of these privileges to federal policy is further illustrated
by cases in which state courts have applied federal privileges, despite
the seeming lack of legal compulsion to do so.'
Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987) (federal law governed the existence of a
non-party journalist's privilege where state claims joined with federal claims).
Another issue that might be addressed in a codification of federal privilege law is a
choice of law rule for privileges in diversity cases. However, such a rule has not been
supplied in other instances in which the Federal Rules of Evidence provide for state law to
apply (See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 302 and 601) and has not proved to be necessary in
connection with those rules. It would seem equally unnecessary in connection with
privilege rules. See also discussions in Dudley, supra note 70, at 1836-39; Margaret A.
Berger, Privileges, Presumptions and Competency of Witnesses in Federal Court: A Federal
Choice-of-Law Rule, 42 BROOK. L. REv. 417 (1976).
281. In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1991); DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T
Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th
1985); See also discussion in Dudley, supra note 70, at 1811-12.
282. 345 U.S. 1(1953).
283. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
284. See, e.g., Hinckley v. United States, 140 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
285. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
286. See, e.g., Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565 (Alaska 1980) (identity of federal
informant).
These privileges are likely to be invoked only rarely in diversity
cases. However, when they are, they should be governed by federal
law. Any newly drafted rules should at least provide for the
application of such privileges in all federal court proceedings.
Conclusion
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress
has dabbled in the creation of evidence law. For example, it has
enacted a tax practitioner privilege. ' It has recently also considered
other privilege legislation such as a bill that would have created a
parent-child privilege and a privilege relating to "study or research
of academic, commercial, scientific, or technical issues."'  Despite
such enactments and proposed enactments, the common-law
approach contemplated by Rule 501 is the norm. This article
advocates a change in that norm. The change should come from a
cooperative effort between the judicial and legislative branches.
Congress has the ultimate drafting responsibility with regard to
any rule governing privilege.29  However, there is a ready-made
vehicle for providing judicial input into the drafting process. The
Judicial Conference of the United States has standing committees set
up to consider amendments to rules, including the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 9' Those committees are composed not only of federal
judges, but of state court judges, practitioners and academics. The
committees hold open deliberative sessions as well as public hearings
on any proposed amendments to the rules. The Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Evidence has begun to consider the
possibility of codification of the privilege rules.29
Privilege rules should be drafted by the federal judiciary, through
the Advisory Committees, and subjected to public scrutiny. When a
set of rules, satisfactory to the Judicial Conference, is developed those
287. 26 U.S.C. §7525.
288. H.R. 2876,106th Cong. (1999).
289. S. 1437,106th Cong. (1999).
290. See text accompanying notes 61-62, supra.
291. In 1993, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence was
reconstituted for the first time since the promulgation of the Rules in 1974. See the
minutes of the Committee's first meeting, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslMinutes/ev9-30.htm.
292. In April, 1999, the Advisory Committee appointed a subcommittee to begin a
project that might propose a codification of the law of privilege. Minutes of April, 1999
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslMinutes/499minEV.pdf. The subcommittee has met and
reported to the Advisory Committee at each of the meetings since that date. There has
been a tentative discussion of proposed rules, but no decision has yet been made on the
suggestion of any rule to the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, to which the
Advisory Committee reports. See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/evdocket.pdf.
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rules should be submitted to the Supreme Court. Once the Court has
considered and approved the rules, they can be sent to Congress for
further public hearing, debate and enactment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2074. Congress' influence with regard to the rules of privilege would
be more substantial than in the case of other procedural rules where
the rules can be either accepted, by doing nothing, or rejected.
Nevertheless, the drafting process and process of public debate would
be much the same as with any other rules governing evidence or court
procedure. The result should be a well-considered set of rules that
would form the basis of a law of privilege that would adequately
protect relationships worthy of such protection and help foster
privacy protection for the public. The public would get the benefit
both of the open legislative process and the wisdom of the judiciary
charged with implementing the rules on a day-to-day basis.
The false starts of the late 1960s and early 1970s in drafting
privilege laws should be a learning experience for both the judiciary
and for Congress. We can have a workable law of evidentiary
privileges just as in other areas of the law of evidence. Congress, by
its own election, must be involved in the process. The path that a
privilege code must follow has all of the potential pitfalls of any major
piece of legislation. Given the history, those pitfalls may doom any
attempt to failure. But the judicial system can start the process, get
input from the bar and other interested persons, and develop a set of
privilege rules that are both workable and represent prevailing
societal interests. At least Congress will then have the opportunity to
improve the administration of justice in the federal courts.

